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Abstract
We develop a social network model of occupational segregation be-
tween diﬀerent social groups, generated by the existence of positive in-
breeding bias among individuals from the same group. If network refer-
rals are important in getting a job, then expected inbreeding bias in the
contact network structure induces diﬀerent career choices for individuals
from diﬀerent social groups. This further translates into stable occupa-
tional segregation equilibria in the labour market. We derive the condi-
tions for persistent wage and unemployment inequality in the segregation
equilibria. Our framework is proposed as complementary to existing the-
ories used to explain labour market inequalities between groups divided
by race, ethnicity or gender.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Occupational segregation between various social groups is an enduring and per-
vasive phenomenon with important implications for the labour market. Richard
Posner recently pointed out that “a glance of the composition of diﬀerent oc-
cupations shows that in many of them, particularly racial, ethnic, and religious
groups, along with one or the other sex and even groups deﬁned by sexual ori-
entation (heterosexual vs. homosexual), are disproportionately present or ab-
sent”1.There are countless empirical studies, particularly within sociology and
economics, that document the extent of occupational segregation 2.M o s ts t u d -
ies analyzing possible causes of occupational segregation agree that ’classical’
theories such as taste or statistical discrimination by employers cannot explain
alone occupational disparities and their remarkable persistence. While several
meritorious alternative theories were to this date considered, some scientists
with long-standing interest in the area, such as Kenneth Arrow (Arrow, 1998),
particularly referred to modelling the social network interactions as promising
avenue for further research in this context.
In this paper we apply social network theory to dynamically model occupa-
tional segregation in the labour market. Signiﬁcant progress has been achieved
in modelling labour market phenomena by means of social network analysis.
Recent articles have investigated the eﬀect of social networks on employment,
wage inequality, labour market transitions, and social welfare.3 To the best of
our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to model occupational segregation by
social network analysis.
We construct a simple three-stage model of occupational segregation between
two homogeneous, exogenously-given, mutually exclusive social groups, acting
in a two-jobs labour market. In the ﬁrst stage each individual chooses one of
two specialized educations to become a worker. In the second stage individuals
randomly form “friendship” ties with other individuals, with a tendency to form
more ties with members of the same social group, what we call inbreeding bias.
In the third stage workers use their networks of friendship contacts to search
for jobs.
We show that with a positive inbreeding bias within social groups, a com-
1The quote is from a post in “The Becker-Posner Blog”, see http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com. Posner goes on by giving a clear-cut example of gender occupational segregation:
“a much higher percentage of biologists than of physicists are women, and at least one branch
of biology, primatology, appears to be dominated by female scientists. It seems unlikely that
all sex-related diﬀerences in occupational choice are due to discrimination”
2See for instance Beller (1984), Albelda (1986), Rich (1999), Charles and Grusky (2004).
Some such papers, eg. Sorensen (2004), also discuss the extent of segregation between social
groups by workplace or industry. Here we model segregation by occupation alone, which
appears to be dominant at least relative to segregation by industry. Weeden and Sorensen
(2001) convincingly show that occupational segregation in the USA is much stronger than
segregation by industries and that if one wishes to focus on one single dimension, “occupation
is a good choice, at least relative to industry”.
3Very recent papers include Arrow and Borzekowski (2003), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson
(2004, 2006), Fontaine (2004), Lavezzi and Meccheri (2004), Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2006),
Ioannides and Soutevent (2006).
2plete polarization in terms of occupations across the two groups can arise as a
stable equilibrium outcome. These results are independent of the existence and
extent of an eventual second inbreeding bias, by education. We extend the basic
model by allowing for “good” and “bad” jobs, to analyze equilibrium wage and
unemployment inequality between the two social groups. We show that with
large diﬀerences in job attraction (wages), a natural outcome of the model is
that one group fully specializes in the good job, while the other group mixes
over the two jobs. The group that specializes in the good job always has a
higher payoﬀ and a lower unemployment rate in this partial segregation equi-
librium. Furthemore, with a suﬃciently large intra-group inbreeding bias, the
fully specializing group also has a higher equilibrium wage rate and it largely
crowds out the mixing group from the good jobs. Our model is thus able to
explain typical empirical patterns of gender, race or ethnical labour inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. We review empirical evidence on the rele-
vance of job contact networks and the existence of inbreeding bias in Section 2,
we describe our model of occupational seg r e g a t i o ni nS e c t i o n3 ,a n dw ed i s c u s s
key results on the segregation equilibria in Section 4. We then derive results
when jobs are not equally attractive in Section 5. A discussion on the timing
and exogeneity of the contact network formation is presented in Section 6. We
summarize and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Evidence on job contact networks and inbreed-
ing bias
2.1 Importance of job contact networks
There is a well established set of stylized facts that show the importance of the
informal job networks in searching and ﬁnding jobs. Firstly, it is known that
on average about 50 percent of the workers obtain jobs through their personal
contacts. Evidence in this sense starts back in the 1960’s and covers multiple
countries, e.g. Rees (1966), Granovetter (1995), Holzer (1987), Montgomery
(1991), Topa (2001). A second fact is that on average 40-50 percent of the
employers use social networks of their current employees (i.e. they hire recom-
mended applicants) to ﬁll their job openings, e.g. Holzer (1987). It was also
found that the employee-employer matches obtained through contacts appear
to have certain common characteristics: those who found jobs through personal
contacts were less likely to quit and had longer tenure e.g. Datcher (1983),
Devine and Kiefer (1991), Simon and Warner (1992), Datcher Loury (2006).
For a more detailed overview of studies on job information networks Ioannides
and Datcher Loury (2004) is a good recent reference. Job contact networks are
thus extremely relevant in the process of matching employees to employers.
32.2 Evidence on intra-group inbreeding biases
There is at the same time extensive empirical evidence on the existence of “in-
breeding biases”, also called “assortative mixing” or “homophily” in the litera-
ture, among people with similar characteristics.
To start with the informal job networks context, early studies by Rees (1966)
and Doeringer and Piore (1971) showed that workers who had been asked for
references concerning new hires, were in general very likely to refer people with
’similar’ features to them. While these similar features can be anything, such as
ability, education, age, race and so on, the focus on our paper shall be on groups
stratiﬁed along exogenous features (ie. one is born in such a group and cannot
alter his/her group membership) such as those divided along the lines of gender,
race or ethnicity. Indeed, most subsequent empirical evidence on inbreeding bias
dealt with such groups. Hence, Marsden (1987) ﬁnds, using the U.S. General So-
cial Survey, that personal contact networks tend to be highly segregated by race,
while other studies such as Brass (1985) or Ibarra (1992), using cross-sectional
single ﬁrm data, ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender segregation in personal networks. Yet
more direct evidence comes from the tabulations in Montgomery (1992), which
unambiguously document the existence of large gender inbreeding biases within
job contact networks: over all occupations in a US sample from the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth, 87 percent of the jobs obtained through contacts
by men were based on information received from other men and 70 percent of
the jobs obtained informally by women were based on information from other
women. This is true even for occupations and industries that are highly segre-
gated. Importantly, Montgomery (1992) shows that these outcomes hold even
when looking at each narrowly deﬁned occupation categories or one-digit indus-
tries4 separately, including traditionally male or female dominated occupations
where job referrals for the minority group members were still obtained with a
very strong inbreeding bias via their own gender group. For example, in male-
dominated occupations such as machine operators, 81 percent of the women
who found their job through a referral, had a female reference. Such ﬁgures are
in fact surprisingly large and- even more surprising- they are in fact likely to be
lower bounds for magnitudes of the inbreeding biases within other exogenous
social groups5. Montgomery (1992) provides more in depth discussion and gives
further references on the evidence on the gender inbreeding bias.
Perhaps the most recent addition to the pile of evidence here is an empirical
study by Fernando and Sousa (2005) on a unique dataset documenting both the
4Weeden and Sorensen (2001) estimate a two-dimensional model of gender segregation, by
industry and occupation, using a data sample generated from the 1990 Equal Employment
Opportunity Supplemental Tabulations File. They ﬁnd much stronger segregation across
occupations than across industries: 86% of the total association in the data is explained by
one dimensional model with only occupational segregation; this increases to about 93% once
industry segregation is also accounted for. See also footnote 2.
5The inbreeding bias by gender is likely to be smaller than inbreeding biases within social
groups diﬀerentiated along race or ethnicity because of the frequent close-knit relationships
between men and women. This is de facto veriﬁed for instance by Marsden (1988) who ﬁnds
strong inbreeding biases in the contacts between individuals of the same race or ethnicity but
less pronounced inbreeding bias within gender categories.
4recruitment and the hiring stages for an entry-level job at a call centre of a large
US bank. This study also ﬁnds unambiguously that contact networks contribute
to the gender skewing of jobs and in addition documents directly that there is
strong evidence of gender homophily in the refereeing process of the contacts:
referees of both genders tend to strongly produce same sex referrals.
Indirect pieces of evidence come from other research areas. Extensive re-
search on homophily in general shows that people tend to be friends with sim-
ilar others, see for instance McPherson et al (2001) for a review, with ’exoge-
nous’ characters such as race, ethnicity or gender, being essential dimensions
of homophily. The literature also shows that friendship patterns are more ho-
mophilous than would be expected by chance or availability constraints, even
after controlling for the unequal distribution of races or sexes through social
structure, e.g. Shrum, Cheek and Hunter (1988). There is furthermore a con-
siderable body of evidence pointing towards "pure" same race preferences in
marrying or dating ( eg. the “mating taboo” in Wong, 2003 or the speed dating
preferences in Fishman et al, 2006), among very young kids (e.g. Hraba and
Grant, 1970), among audiences of television shows (Dates, 1980, Lee, 2006) etc.
Finally, we address shortly the relative importance of inbreeding biases
within ’exogenously given’ versus ’endogenously created’ social groups. As al-
ready mentioned, assortative mixing happens along a great variety of dimen-
sions. However, the empirical literature so far documents that, within the soci-
ety as a whole, the importance of the ’natural’ inbreeding bias within exogenous
groups such as those divided by race, ethnicity, gender and- to a certain extent-
religion, outweighs inbreeding biases within endogenously formed groups such
as those stratiﬁed by educational, political or economic lines. For example, us-
ing US data, Marsden (1988) ﬁnds strong inbreeding biases in contacts between
individuals of the same race, ethnicity or religion and, less pronounced inbreed-
ing bias by sex, age or education level. Another study by Tampubolon (2005),
using UK data, ﬁnds that the dynamics of friendship is strongly aﬀected by
gender, marital status and age, but not by education and only marginally by
social class.
3 A model of occupational segregation
Based on the stylized facts mentioned in Section 2, we build a parsimonious
theoretical model of social network interaction, able to explain stable occupa-
tional segregation without a need for alternative theories. Our model should
be seen as complementary to existing theories that explain observed occupa-
tional segregation patterns. While our framework has some common elements
with group membership models used on a large scale in sociology for explain-
ing general segregation patterns (neighborhood segregation, school segregation,
workplace segregation etc), it markedly diﬀers from these by explicitly modelling
the dynamic network interaction 6.
6The precursor of many such studies is the seminal work by Schelling (1971) on the emer-
gence of high levels of neighbourhood racial segregation from tiny diﬀerences in the tolerance
5Let us consider the following setup. A continuum of individuals with mea-
sure N is equally divided into two social groups, Reds (R) and Greens (G). The
individuals are homogeneous apart from their social color. They can work in
two occupations, A or B. Each occupation requires a corresponding thorough
specialized education (career track), hence a worker cannot work in an occu-
pation if she is not qualiﬁed to do so by having followed the educational track
corresponding to that occupation. We assume that it is too costly for individ-
uals to follow both educational tracks. Hence, individuals have to choose their
education before they enter the labour market. For example, graduating high
school students may face the choice of pursuing a medical career or a career in
technology. Both choices require several years of expensive specialized training,
which makes it unfeasible to follow both career tracks.
Consider now the following timing:
1. Individuals choose one education in order to specialize either in occupation
A or in occupation B;
2. Individuals randomly establish “friendship” relationships, thus forming a
network of contacts;
3. Individuals participate in the labour market. Individual i obtains a job
with probability si and if she has a job, she earns a wage wi. If she does
not have a job she obtains wage 0.
We postpone a detailed discussion on the timing of the three stages and on
the exogeneity of the contact network formation in the second stage to Section
6, and proceed here with the implications of these assumptions. The choice of
e d u c a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst stage involves strategic behavior. Workers choose the edu-
cation that maximizes their expected payoﬀ given the choices of other workers,
and we therefore look for a Nash equilibrium in this stage. A worker’s expected
payoﬀ is determined by the network formation process in the second stage and
by the employment process in the third stage. We make these stages more
speciﬁc in what follows.
In the second stage the workers form a network of contacts. We assume
this network to be random with an inbreeding bias. Hence, we assume that the
probability for two workers to create a tie is 0 ≤ p<1 when the two workers
are from diﬀerent social groups and follow diﬀerent education tracks; when the
two workers are from the same social group, the probability of creating a tie
increases with λ>0. Similarly, if two workers choose the same education, then
the probability of creating a tie increases with κ ≥ 0.A si tw i l lt u r no u tb e l o w ,
since the magnitude of κ will be irrelevant for our results, we do not impose any
threshold levels of members of each race group, regarding the presence of the other race. Our
framework shares a few elements with Schelling’s, i.e. we operate with a two-category model
and our group ’inbreeding bias’ can be seen as the analogue of Schelling’s group “tolerance
level”, but markedly diﬀers otherwise, in assumptions, dynamics and results. A more closely
related model to ours is the one by Benabou (1993): we address brieﬂy the main similarities
and diﬀerences between these two models in the beginning of our discussion section.
6Table 1: The probability of a tie between two individuals, depending on the
group membership and education choice.
Education
same diﬀerent
Social same p + κ + λp + λ
group
diﬀerent p + κp
further restrictions on it vis-a-vis p or λ, other than securing p + λ + κ ≤ 1.
This leads to the tie formation probabilities given in Table 1. We will refer to
two workers that create a tie as “friends”7
The third stage we envision for this model is that of a dynamic labour
process à la Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) or Bramoullé and Saint-Paul
(2006), in which employed workers randomly lose their jobs, while unemployed
workers search for jobs. Unemployed workers receive job information either
directly, or indirectly through their friends. The details of such a process are
unimportant for our purposes. However, what is important is the assumption
that unemployed workers have a higher propensity to receive job information
when they have more friends with the same job background, that is, with the
same choice of education8. Denote the probability that individual i becomes
employed by si.D e ﬁne si ≡ s(xi),w h e r exi is the measure of friends of i
with the same education as i has. We thus assume that s(x) is diﬀerentiable,
0 <s (0) < 1 (there is non-zero amount of direct job search) and s0(x) > 0 for
all x>0 (the probability of being employed increases in the number of friends
with the same education).
It is instructive to show how si depends on the education choices of i and
the choices of all other workers. Denote by μR and μG the fractions of Reds and
respectively Greens that choose education A. It follows that fractions 1 − μR
and 1 − μG of groups R and respectively G choose education B. Given the tie
formation probabilities from Table 1 and some algebra, the employment rate sX
A
of A-workers in group X ∈ {R,G} will be given by:
sX
A(μR,μ G)=s((p + κ)¯ μN + λμXN/2) (1)
7We do not consider the possibility that individuals have diﬀerent inbreeding biases or
diﬀerent probabilities of making friends in general, across the two homogeneous groups (hence
λ and/or p are identical in the two groups). This could be an interesting extension for future
research. There is for example some evidence in the gender homophily literature that men
tend to have better overall access to contact networks than women (suggestive of higher p)a n d
that women seem to use more their non-kin ties in ’instrumental’ networks than in ’expressive’
networks (suggestive of smaller λ); see for instance Moore (1990) or the introductory discussion
in Petersen, Saporta and Seidel (2000) and the references therein.
8This implicitly assumes that everybody has the same chance on the formal labour market
or, in other words, that direct job search intensity is exogenously given for everybody.
7and similarly, the employment rate sX
B of B-workers in group X will be
sX
B(μR,μ G)=s((p + κ)(1 − ¯ μ)N + λ(1 − μX)N/2) (2)





B for X,Y ∈ {R,G}, X 6= Y ,i ﬀ μX >μ Y
and λ>0. We will see in Section 4 that the ranking of the employment
rates is crucial, as it creates a group-speciﬁcn e t w o r ke ﬀect. That is, keeping
this ordering, if only employment matters (jobs are equally attractive), then
individuals have an incentive to choose the same education as other individuals
in their social group. Importantly, it is straightforward to see that this ordering
of the employment rates depends on λ, but it does not depend on κ. Therefore,
only the inbreeding bias among members of the same social group is relevant to
our results.
The eventual payoﬀ of the workers depends on their employment probability
and on the wage they receive. Without loss of generality we assume that an
unemployed worker receives zero wage. We further assume that the wage rate
decreases in the number of employed workers that choose a particular type
of education. The assumption of a decreasing wage when the total number
of employed workers increases can be easily explained using a simple classical
model of a 2-goods economy with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and a linear
production function with labour as single input. Intuitively, when more workers
are employed as A, the economy produces more A-products, which have to
ﬁnd their way to the consumer market. As the market price drops whenever
production output increases, it follows that, in a competitive product and labour
market, wages drop as well. Thus wages of A (B)-jobs are negatively related to
the number of workers that choose an A (B)-education.
The assumption is formalized as follows. Let LA be the total measure of em-








Then the wage of an A-job, wA(LA), (and respectively of a B-job, wB(LB))i s
diﬀerentiable and decreasing in LA (or LB).
To ensure a unique labour market equilibrium, we make the following as-
sumption on the wage function:



































Part (i) of Assumption 1 implies that at least some workers choose education
A and some workers choose education B. In other words, everyone going for one
of the two educations cannot be an equilibrium. In part (ii) we assume that the
education choice of an individual has a larger marginal eﬀect on the wage rate
than on the employment probability within a group. Parts (i) and (ii) guarantee
the uniqueness of our results.
Assumption 1 above essentially states that the network eﬀect on the wage
rate is stronger than its eﬀect on the employment rate, for each social group.
This assumption is not restrictive in light of our model’s third stage. Thus, the
assumption is obviously plausible in a competitive labour market without wage
rigidity and random job separation rates, where wages react fully and instanta-
neously to shortages or increases in labour supply. Moreover, the employment
probability of each individual in our model is bounded between s(0) > 0 and 1,
with s(0) capturing the employment probability in the absence of any ties and
thus induced only by the exogeneously given direct job ﬁnding rate. Hence, a
higher s(0) i m p l i e sl e s so fa ni m p a c to ft h en e t w o r ke ﬀect on the employment
rate.
We can now deﬁne the payoﬀ of a worker. The payoﬀ function of a an
A-educated worker from social group X ∈ {R,G} is
ΠX




B(μR,μ G)=wB (LB(μR,μ G))sX
B(μR,μ G). (6)
















































The ﬁrst term of the derivatives (7) and (8) measures the eﬀect of the education
choice on the labour supply and on wages, whereas the second term measures
the eﬀect of education choice on the employment probability. It is now straight-































Hence, the payoﬀ of an individual i decreases with the fraction of other individ-
uals in the same group that choose the same education as i does.
93.1 Equilibrium
We would like to characterize the Nash equilibria in the model above. We are in
particular interested in those equilibria in which there is segregation. We deﬁne
segregation as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Let μX, X ∈ {R,G}, be the fraction of workers in social group
X that choose education A. There is complete segregation if μR =0and
μG =1 , or, vice versa, μR =1and μG =0 . There is partial segregation if
for X ∈ {R,G} and Y ∈ {R,G}, Y 6= X: μX =0but μY < 1, or, vice versa,
μX =1but μY > 0 .
In a Nash equilibrium each worker chooses the education that gives the
highest payoﬀ, given the education choices of all other workers. Since workers of
the same social group are homogenous, a Nash equilibrium implies that if some
worker in a group chooses education A (B), then no other worker in the same
group should prefer education B (A). With this idea in mind, we reformulate
the equilibrium concept in a particularly useful way.
Deﬁnition 2 Let μX, X ∈ {R,G}, be the fraction of workers in social group
X that choose education A.A p a i r (μR,μ G) is an equilibrium if and only if,
for X ∈ {R,G}, the following statements hold
ΠX
A(μR,μ G) ≤ ΠX
B(μR,μ G) if μX =0 (10)
ΠX
A(μR,μ G)=ΠX
B(μR,μ G) if 0 <μ X < 1 (11)
ΠX
A(μR,μ G) ≥ ΠX
B(μR,μ G) if μX =1 (12)
In the initial analysis adopting this deﬁnition we ﬁnd multiple equilibria.
However, some of these equilibria are not dynamically stable and we are not
interested in them. We therefore use a simple stability concept based on a
standard myopic adjustment process of strategies, which takes place before the
education decision is made. That is, we think of the equilibrium as the outcome
of an adjustment process. In this process, individuals repeatedly announce their
preferred education choice, and more and more workers revise their education
choice if it is proﬁtable to do so, given the choice of the other workers.9 Con-










The stability properties of stationary points in such dynamic systems are well-
known in the literature. We base our deﬁnition on these properties, taking into
account that the process might converge to a segregation equilibrium, thus to
the boundaries of the solution space.
9One could think of such a process as the discussions students have before the end of the
high school about their preferred career. An alternative with a longer horizon is an overlapping
generations model, in which the education choice of each new generation partly depends on
the choice of the previous generation.
10Deﬁnition 3 Let (μ∗
R,μ ∗





























































The equilibrium is weakly stable if the above conditions only hold with weak
inequality signs.
4O c c u p a t i o n a l s e g r e g a t i o n
We initially assume that both jobs are equally attractive when the labor supply
is the same. That is
Assumption 2 For all x ∈ (0,N] wA(x)=wB(x).
We next characterize equilibria for two cases. In the benchmark case network
eﬀects are important, but there is no inbreeding bias in the social network, ie.
λ =0 . In the second case, we consider the full model including network eﬀects
and an inbreeding bias. Of course, in either case we allow for an arbitrary
inbreeding bias by education, κ.
4.1 A labour market without intra-group inbreeding
We ﬁrst consider a labour market in which there is no inbreeding bias in the
social network. That is λ =0 . We obtain a standard result
Proposition 1 Suppose λ =0 , Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (μ∗
R,μ ∗
G) is a











G)=s((p + κ)N/2). (14)
for X ∈ {R,G},a n d
wA (LA(μ∗
R,μ ∗




This proposition simply restates the classical view that the price of labour,
the wage, is equal to the value of the marginal product of labour. Since workers
are homogenous with respect to their productivity, everyone earns the same
wage and occupational segregation or social inequality does not occur.10 Note
that Proposition 1 does not give a unique equilibrium, but a (convex) set of
equilibria (μ∗
R,μ ∗
G) for which wA(·)=wB(·).11
One may be surprised that network eﬀects and inbreeding bias by education
do not directly result in segregation. One has to remember however that there
is no group-speciﬁc inbreeding bias in the social network and hence that the
generated network eﬀects, as well as the wages, are group-independent. Hence,
the value of an A-education or B-education only depends on the total number of
other workers that choose education A or B, and not on the number of workers
choosing A or B in each of the social group. It should then be clear that there
is no reason to expect segregation, as the group identity does not matter in
making an education choice.
4.2 A labour market with intra-group inbreeding
We now consider the unrestricted version of our labour market model. A ﬁrst
observation is that the equilibrium changes drastically, even with a small amount
of inbreeding bias.
Proposition 2 Suppose λ>0, Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. A weakly stable
equilibrium (μ∗
R,μ ∗
G),i nw h i c h0 <μ ∗
R < 1 and 0 <μ ∗
G < 1,d o e sn o te x i s t .
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that even with a small intra-group inbreeding bias,
segregation by occupation is a natural outcome. At least one social group spe-
cializes fully in one type of occupation. The intuition is that an inbreeding bias
in the social network among members of the same social group creates a group-
dependent network eﬀect. Thus, if slightly more Red workers choose A than
Greens do, then the value of an A-education is higher for the Reds than for the
Greens, while the value of a B-education is lower in the Reds’ group. Positive
feedback then ensures that the initially small diﬀerences in education choices
between the two groups widen and widen until at least one group segregates
completely into one type of education.
While we have now shown that in a labour market model with network eﬀects
and inbreeding bias segregation is a natural outcome, the question remains
10Since all workers are indiﬀerent between education A or B, a partial segregation equilib-
rium does exist. However, this equilibrium would be excluded if workers in the same social
group are slightly heterogeneous with respect to their education preferences or their produc-
tivity.
11This is also the reason why each equilibrium is only weakly stable. After a small perturba-
tion to an equilibrium, a best response dynamic process as the one described above converges
back to the set for which wA = wB. However, the process does not converge to the ’initial’
equilibrium that was originally perturbed. Thus the equilibria cannot be strongly stable.
12what the segregation equilibria look like. Depending on the functional form of
wA(·) and wB(·) and s(·) , there could be many equilibria. However, complete
segregation is the most prominent outcome.
Proposition 3 Suppose λ>0, Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (μR,μ G)=
(1,0) and (μR,μ G)=( 0 ,1) are the only stable equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 3 shows that complete segregation is always an equilibrium out-
come when there is a positive inbreeding bias in the social network. That is,
one social group specializes in one occupation, and the other group in the other
occupation.
5 Social inequality
The discussion so far ignored eventual equilibrium diﬀerentials in wages and
unemployment between the two types of jobs. In fact, since we have assumed
that A and B jobs are equally attractive, it is easily seen that under complete
segregation, there cannot be wage or unemployment inequality. However, not
only is this in sharp contrast to observed gender and racial gaps in wages and
unemployment, but it is also not obvious how our result of complete segregation
can be sustained when there are large wage-induced incentives. Why would
someone stick to the education choice of her social group when the wage beneﬁts
of choosing the other career track are very large? This motivates us to extend
our framework in order to look at the robustness of our results under wage and
employment inequality. We do this by making the following assumption on the
wage function:
Assumption 3 For every x ∈ (0,N), wA(x) >w B(x).
This says that if there are as many A-educated workers as B-educated work-
ers, then the A-educated workers earn a higher wage. The implicit assumption
behind Assumption 3 is that the marginal utility consumers derive from prod-
uct A is larger than the marginal utility from product B. T h i si san a t u r a l
assumption as there is no a priori reason to expect that diﬀerent products are
equally appreciated.
We derive results on wage and unemployment inequality under Assump-
tion 3. Our ﬁrst observation is that the proof of Proposition 2 does not depend
on the fact that wA(x)=wB(x) for every x. Hence, this proposition also holds
under Assumption 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose λ>0, Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. A weakly stable
equilibrium (μ∗
R,μ ∗
G),i nw h i c h0 <μ ∗
R < 1 and 0 <μ ∗
G < 1,d o e sn o te x i s t .
Proof. Same as Proposition 2
We next characterize the segregation equilibria. We consider two cases;
either the diﬀerence between the attractiveness of A and B-jobs is relatively
13small compared to the social network eﬀect, or the diﬀerence is relatively large.
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the job diﬀerence is relatively small. In this
case, complete segregation remains an equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose λ>0, Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Deﬁne sH ≡ s((p +







Then (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0) and (μR,μ G)=( 0 ,1) are the only two stable equilibria.
In these equilibria,
wA >w B,







This proposition states that if the diﬀerence in wages is not too large, com-
plete segregation is always an equilibrium outcome when there is a positive
inbreeding bias in the social network. Thus one social group specializes in one
occupation, and the other group in the other occupation. Since the social groups
are of equal size, the employment probabilities in the two social groups are the
same. However, since the wage rate of A−workers is higher in the equilibrium,
the social group that specializes in occupation A obtains a higher payoﬀ than
the other group. Hence, social inequality is a natural outcome of this model.
Interestingly, if some workers make mistakes in their education choice, then
the workers that are the worst oﬀ are from the same social group as the workers
that are the best oﬀ.T h u s ,i fμR =1and μG =0 , then the Reds that choose A
receive the highest wage and have the best employment probabilities. However,
if some of the Reds choose B by mistake, then these Red B-workers are the most
disadvantaged, as they earn the lowest wage and have the lowest employment
chances. The payoﬀs of the workers who ’make mistakes’ in their choice of
education are materialized in the last two terms of inequality (17) above.
We turn next to the case in which wage diﬀerentials are large. We have the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose λ>0, Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Deﬁne sH ≡ s((p +







(i) There is no equilibrium with complete segregation.
14(ii) There are exactly two stable equilibria with partial segregation, in which








The proposition makes clear that complete segregation cannot be sustained
if the wage diﬀerential is too large. Starting from complete segregation, a large
wage diﬀerential gives incentives to the group specialized in B-jobs to switch
to A-jobs. Interestingly, the unsustainable complete segregation equilibrium is
then replaced by a partial equilibrium in which one group specializes in job A,
while the other group has both A and B-workers. As in the previous case of
small wage diﬀerentials, the workers of the group specializing in A-jobs receive
the highest payoﬀs, hence we have again a social inequality outcome. If these
workers make a mistake in their education choice, they are again the worst oﬀ
of everybody; their payoﬀ is materialized in the last term of inequality (19).
Remark that it is the higher employment rate of the group specializing in
A that makes the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ inequality from Proposition 6. The
employment rate of group X fully specializing in A-jobs is given by sX
A(1,x),
where x is the fraction of A workers in group Y that mixes over the jobs. On
the other hand, the employment rate of group Y is xsY
A(1,x)+( 1−x)sY
B(1,x).
Hence, the group that fully specializes in the A-job has a lower unemployment
rate than the other group.
We now know that, in a partial segregation equilibrium, the ’advantaged’
group fully specializes in the good job and also has a higher employment rate.
But does this group also earn a higher wage rate in equilibrium? The following
proposition shows that this depends on the amount of group inbreeding and the
labour supply ratio that equalizes wages.
Proposition 7 Suppose λ>0, Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Deﬁne sH ≡ s((p +




ˆ μ ∈ (0,1), such that
wA(LA(1, ˆ μ)) = wB(LB(1, ˆ μ)), (20)




2(p + κ + λ)
,




2(p + κ + λ)
,
then ˆ μ<μ ∗ < 1 and wA(LA(1,μ ∗)) <w B(LB(1,μ ∗)).
15Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 says that, if the group inbreeding bias λ is large relative to p
and κ (in fact p+κ) and there is a big diﬀerence between the good and the bad
jobs (case (i) above), then not only does one group fully specialize in one job
and beneﬁt from a higher employment rate (as seen already in Proposition 6),
but at the same time its wage rate is higher in the equilibrium. In contrast, the
group that mixes over jobs is to a large extent excluded (’crowded out’) from
the good jobs. Moreover, the latter social group not only earns on average less
than the fully specializing social group, but also its unemployment rate is higher
in the equilibrium. If, on the contrary, the inbreeding bias λ is small relative
to p and κ and there is a big diﬀerence between the good and the bad jobs
(case (ii) above), then the employment rate (and the payoﬀ) of the group fully
specializing in job A remains higher than the employment rate of the mixing
group, but the average wage inequality in the equilibrium reverses. Since the
wage rate of the A-workers is now lower in the equilibrium, the average wage
rate of workers from the social group fully specializing in A will be lower than
the average wage rate of the workers mixing over the two jobs.
T h e r ea r es o m ei n t e r e s t i n gc o n s i d e r a t i o n st ob em a d eh e r e .T h ec o n c l u s i o n s
above concerning average wage diﬀerentials between the workers in the two
groups, in the partial segregation equilibrium, are hinging on the relative size
of λ relative to p + κ,i nt h et e r m λ
2(p+κ+λ) from the inequality conditions in
Proposition 7.It is interesting to go beyond the theoretical aspect and highlight
the practical relevance of this result. First, as seen from the empirical evidence
put forward in Section 2, the inbreeding bias by education, κ, is typically found
to be much lower relative to the inbreeding bias along racial, ethnical or gender
lines. The second interesting situation is a scenario where the probability of
making contacts in general, p, were already extremely high relative to the the
intra-group inbreeding bias. However, given the surprisingly large size of intra-
group inbreeding biases in personal networks of contacts found empirically, this
is also unlikely. Hence, the likelihood is very high that in practice λ would
dominate the other parameters in the cutoﬀ term λ
2(p+κ+λ).
We sum up the ﬁndings from the last two propositions. The fully specializing
group is always being better oﬀ in terms of unemployment rate and payoﬀ,
independent of either relative or absolute sizes of λ, p and κ (as long as λ>0,
of course), as shown in Proposition 6. Furthermore, given the observed patterns
of social networks discussed in Section 2, the condition of λ dominant relative to
p and κ is likely to be met. This ensures that the group fully specializing in the
good job always has a higher wage in the equilibrium than the group mixing over
the two jobs, as proved in Proposition 7; in addition, a very large λ also means
that the group that mixes over jobs is in fact largely crowded out from the good
job. Note that this partial segregation equilibrium is in remarkable agreement
with observed occupational, wage and unemployment disparities in the labour
market. We conclude that our simple model oﬀers a plausible explanation for
major empirical patterns of labour market inequality.
166 Discussion
The model we presented in this paper is similar in structure to that of Roland
Benabou (1993). In our model the social groups play the role of the neighbor-
hoods from Benabou’s framework, while our social networks with inbreeding
bias are the analogue of his local externalities. An essential diﬀerence between
our paper and Benabou’s is that we focus on the persistence of wage and un-
employment inequality, and on how this depends on the degree of inbreeding
bias. In contrast, in Benabou (1993) the wage of highly educated individuals is
always higher than the wage of individuals with low education. The model in
this paper provides a plausible explanation for the persistence of occupational
segregation and wage inequality.
Our model relies on two crucial assumptions that we did not so far discuss
in depth: the timing and the exogeneity of the network formation.
6.1 Timing of network formation
We assumed that individuals ﬁrst choose an education, and then form a network
of job contacts. As a consequence, individuals have to make expectations about
the network they could form, and base their education decisions on these expec-
tations. This is in contrast to earlier work on the role of networks in the labour
market. In former research, the network was supposed to be already in place, or
the network was formed in the ﬁrst stage (Montgomery, 1991; Calvó-Armengol
& Jackson, 2004).
Our departure from the earlier frameworks raises questions about the as-
sumed timing of the education choice. Are crucial career decisions made before
or after job contacts are formed? One might be tempted to answer: both. Of
course everyone is born with family ties, and in early school and in the neighbor-
hood children form more ties. It is furthermore known that peer-group pressure
among children has a strong eﬀect on decisions to, for instance, smoke or en-
gage in criminal activities and, no doubt, family and early friends do also form
a non-negligible source of inﬂuence when making crucial career decisions. How-
ever, we argue that most job-relevant contacts (so called ’instrumental ties’) are
made later, for instance at the university or early at the workplace or simply
when starting to look for a suitable job, hence after a specialized career track
has been chosen. Even if those ties are typically not as strong as family ties,
they are more likely to provide relevant information on vacancies to job seekers.
Granovetter (1973, 1985) provides convincing evidence that job seekers more
often receive crucial job information from acquaintances ("weak ties") instead
of family or close friends ("strong ties"). If the vast majority of such instru-
mental ties are formed after the individual embarked on a (irreversible) career-
and we strongly believe so- then it is justiﬁed to consider a model in which the
job contact network is formed after making a career choice.
176.2 Exogeneity of network formation
One of our assumptions is that individuals form a stochastic contact network
(with an inbreeding bias). This means that the probability that an individual i
forms a tie with individual j is exogenously given and constant. Critics might
see this a problematic assumption since establishing a friendship between two
individuals typically involves a rational choice from the part of each of those
individuals, as well. It is therefore plausible that individuals try to optimize
their job contact network in order to maximize their chances on the labour
market. In particular, individuals from the disadvantaged social groups should
have an incentive to form ties with individuals from the advantaged group.
While the above argument may be true, the harsh reality is that this simply
does not happen on a large scale. In Section 2 we provide an abundance of
evidence that strong inbreeding bias exists even within groups that have strong
labour market incentives not to preserve such an inbreeding bias in forming
their ties. The reason could be that, even though individuals decide rationally
on the friendships they make, the payoﬀ of forming a tie is mainly determined
by various social and cultural factors, and only for a smaller part by beneﬁts
from the potential transmission of valuable job information. On top of that,
studies such as, for instance, Granovetter (2002) also note that many people
would feel exploited if they ﬁnd out that someone befriends them for the selﬁsh
reason of obtaining job information. The s ee l e m e n t sm i g h th i n d e rt h er o l eo f
labour market incentives when forming ties. Hence, while we do not doubt that
incentives play a role when forming ties, we believe that such incentives are not
suﬃcient to undo the eﬀects of the signiﬁcant intra-group inbreeding biases. In
order to keep the model simple, we assume in this paper that network formation
is random with an inbreeding bias.
7 Summary and conclusions
We have investigated a parsimonious social network framework where jobs are
obtained through a network of contacts formed stochastically, after career deci-
sions have been made. We have shown that even with a very small amount of
inbreeding bias within each social group, dynamically stable occupational segre-
gation equilibria will arise. If the wage diﬀerential across the occupations is not
too large, complete segregation will always be sustainable. If the wage diﬀeren-
tial is large, complete segregation cannot be sustained, but a partial segregation
equilibrium in which one of the group fully specializes in one education while
the other group mixes over the career tracks, is sustainable. Furthermore, our
model is able to explain sustained unemployment and wage diﬀerences between
the social groups.
While our social interaction model can describe empirical patterns of oc-
cupational segregation and wage inequality between gender, racial or ethnical
groups, other factors are also documented to play a signiﬁcant role in this con-
text. This model should thus be seen as complement to alternatives such as
18taste discrimination or rational bias by employers, which are still present in
the market despite their (predicted) erosion over time, due to both competitive
pressure and institutional instruments. It is therefore pertinent to directly in-
vestigate how relevant are the mechanisms described in this paper and to assess
their relative strength in explaining observed occupational segregation, vis-à-vis
other proposed theories. Another avenue for future research is to extend this
framework to issues such as the position of minority versus majority groups, by
looking at the interaction between social groups of unequal sizes.
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A Proofs for the propositions in the text
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof.
For λ =0and X ∈ {R,G},w eh a v esX
A(μ∗
R,μ ∗




G)=s((p + κ)(1 − ¯ μ)N). With μR = μ∗
R and μG = μ∗
G =1− μ∗
R,
































= −(p + κ)Ns0 ((p + κ)(1 − ¯ μ)N)/2. (22)
With μR = μ∗
R and μG = μ∗
G =1− μ∗

























∂μG < 0, and
therefore the determinant of G(μ∗
R,μ ∗
G) from expression (13) equals zero. Hence,
the equilibrium (μ∗
R,μ ∗
G) is weakly stable.
Finally, Assumption 1 implies that no other (μR,μ G) can be an equilibrium,
since ΠX
A > ΠX
B for μR + μG < 1,a n dΠX
A < ΠX




G) is a stable equilibrium, and μ∗
R ∈ (0,1) and μ∗
G ∈














































B. But this means that if
μ∗
R >μ ∗



















which contradicts (25). The same reasoning holds for μ∗
R <μ ∗








G cannot be a weakly stable equilibrium. To
see this, suppose that (μ∗,μ ∗) with μ∗ ∈ (0,1) is a weakly stable equilibrium.
Hence ΠX
i (A;μ∗,μ ∗)=ΠX




∂μX ≤ 0 at
μR = μG = μ∗, and det(G(μ∗,μ ∗) ≥ 0,w h e r eG is deﬁn e di n( 1 3 ) .









for X,Y ∈ {R,G} and Y 6= X.F u r t h e r m o r e , sX
A = sY
A for μR = μG = μ∗.
Substituting (26 into (7) and (8), and considering Assumption 1, it follows that,











for X,Y ∈ {R,G}, X 6= Y . But then it is straightforward to see that det(G(μ∗,μ ∗)) <
0. This contradicts weak stability.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. Consider (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0).T h e n sR
A = sG
B = s((p + κ + λ)N/2) and
sR
B = sG












This is clearly a stable equilibrium. The same is true for (μR,μ G)=( 0 ,1).
We only have to show that there are no other stable equilibria. From Propo-
sition 2 we already know that (μR,μ G) with 0 <μ R < 1 and 0 <μ G < 1 cannot
be a stable equilibrium. So consider μR =1 . We know that ΠG
A(1,0) < ΠG
B(1,0).










A(1,μ G) < ΠG
B(1,μ G) for all μG ∈ [0,1], and therefore (1,μ G) can only
be a stable equilibrium if μG =0 . Similarly, if μG =0then only μR =1can be
a stable equilibrium.
A.4 Proposition 5






Hence, (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0) is clearly a stable equilibrium. Further, as LA(1,0) =
LB(1,0) = sHN, it holds that wA >w B at (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0). Finally, at






and this is equivalent to (17). The same is true for (μR,μ G)=( 0 ,1).
Proposition 4 and Assumption 1 ensure that these are the only two equilibria.
A.5 Proposition 6




Thus, if (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0) then Greens would like to deviate by choosing edu-
cation A, and therefore (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,0) cannot be an equilibrium. The same
holds for (μR,μ G)=( 0 ,1).




∂μG < 0. It follows





A(1,μ ∗) >s G
A(1,μ ∗) and sG
B(1,μ ∗) >s R
B(1,μ ∗),s ow eh a v ea t






and this is equivalent to (19) for X = R and Y = G.A s
ΠR
A(1,μ ∗) > ΠR
B(1,μ ∗),
it is also clear that (μR,μ G)=( 1 ,μ ∗) is a stable equilibrium. The same is true
for (μR,μ G)=( μ∗,1).
To show that there is no other equilibrium, note that by (18) ΠR
A(1,0) >
ΠR
B(1,0). Assumption 1 then implies that ΠR
A(μ,0) > ΠR
B(μ,0) for all μ ∈ [0,1].
Hence, (μ,0) and, similarly, (0,μ) cannot be an equilibrium. By Proposition 4
we also know that there is no mixed equilibrium.
24A.6 Proposition 7





Further, by Assumption 1 we know that ΠG
A(1,μ G) − ΠG
B(1,μ G) is strictly
monotonically decreasing in μG.
(i) If ˆ μ< λ
2(p+κ+λ),t h e nsG
A(1, ˆ μ) <s G
B(1, ˆ μ).A swA(LA(1, ˆ μ)) = wB(LB(1, ˆ μ))
it must be that
ΠG
A(1, ˆ μ) < ΠG
B(1, ˆ μ).
B u tt h e ni ta l s om u s tb et h a tμ∗ < ˆ μ.B yP r o p o s i t i o n6w ek n o wt h a tμ∗ > 0.
Hence, 0 <μ ∗ < ˆ μ.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e LA(1,μ ∗) <L A(1, ˆ μ) and LB(1,μ ∗) >
LB(1, ˆ μ),i tm u s tb et h a twA(LA(1, ˆ μ∗)) >w B(LB(1, ˆ μ∗)).
(ii) If ˆ μ> λ
2(p+κ+λ),t h e nsG
A(1, ˆ μ) >s G
B(1, ˆ μ) and ΠG
A(1, ˆ μ) < ΠG
B(1, ˆ μ). But
then μ∗ > ˆ μ. By Assumption 1 we know that μ∗ < 1. Hence, ˆ μ<μ ∗ < 1.
Moreover, since LA(1,μ ∗) >L A(1, ˆ μ) and LB(1,μ ∗) <L B(1, ˆ μ),i tm u s tb e
that wA(LA(1, ˆ μ∗)) <w B(LB(1, ˆ μ∗))
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